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I. INTRODUCTION
The ease of enforcement is often cited as a benefit of the cap-andtrade regulatory approach. Cap-and-trade programs have been credited
with having a “far simpler enforcement system” than traditional air
pollution regulation, with 100% compliance achievable “with virtually no
enforcement effort.”1 It has been said that all an environmental agency
needed to do once a cap-and-trade program is legislated into existence, is to
“set up the reporting and accounting system needed to ensure adequate
enforcement”—a task that is “much less demanding and time-consuming”
than writing regulations for traditional environmental regulation.2
Governmental administration costs for cap-and-trade are reportedly lower
than for traditional regulation, and the relationship between regulators and
regulated entities is less conflict-ridden.3
1. Byron Swift, U.S. Emissions Trading: Myths, Realities, and Opportunities,
NAT. RES. & ENVTL ., M ay-Aug. 2005, at 5.
2. Denny Ellerman, Are Cap and Trade Programs More Environmentally
Effective than Conventional Regulation?, in M OVING TO M ARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION : LESSONS FROM T WENTY YEARS OF EXP ERIENCE 52 (Jody Freeman &
Charles D. Kolstad, eds., 2007).
3. Swift, supra note 2, at 5, 7. See also Sam Napolitano et al., The U.S. Acid Rain
Program: Key Insights from the Design, Operation, and Assessment of a Cap-and-Trade
Program, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 47, 51 (2007) (stating that the flexibility of cap-and-trade
regulation “minimizes the administrative costs”); id. at 57 (discussing how regulators can
create a cooperative relationship with industry in a cap-and-trade program).
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Many of these assertions have been made in the context of discussions
about the Acid Rain Program (ARP), a cap-and-trade program that
began in the mid-1990s to reduce the sulfur dioxide (SO2 ) emissions from
the nation’s power plants.4 However, another cap-and-trade program
established at about the same time with enforcement provisions modeled
after the ARP tells a very different story. In the Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program, designed to reduce the emissions
of precursors to smog in Los Angeles, enforcement turned out to be
very burdensome for the government. From the point of view of the
environmental agency that administered the program, “an unanticipated
consequence of RECLAIM was the enormous amount of resources it
takes to adequately monitor and enforce compliance.”5
This Article uses the histories of the ARP and RECLAIM to show that
even when monitoring and enforcement provisions for cap-and-trade
programs are designed in a similar way,6 the resulting enforcement
systems and enforcement outcomes may be very different. Part I of the
article tells the enforcement story of the ARP. It appears to be a story of
regulatory efficiency and success. Part II tells the enforcement story of
RECLAIM. While not a failure, RECLAIM enforcement seems to have been
full of difficulties that necessitated large amounts of administrative time
and resources. This part presents the results of an empirical analysis of
RECLAIM enforcement actions from 1994 through 2006. The analysis
shows that RECLAIM had many more enforcement actions than the
ARP, despite the fact that the ARP was a much larger cap-and-trade
program in terms of the volume of pollution regulated. Similarly, the
amount of monetary penalties assessed in RECLAIM for noncompliance was much larger than the amount assessed in the ARP.

4. See, e.g., Ellerman, supra note 3; Swift, supra note 1; Dallas Burtraw & Byron
Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis of the Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain
Program, 26 ENVTL . L. REP . 10,411, at 10,421–22 (1996) (stating that that the program’s
“compliance mechanism is open and straightforward, and together with the Act’s penalty
provisions, create an almost self-executing enforcement system,” and further stating that
“there has been virtually 100 percent compliance . . . with little need for enforcement action”).
5. S. COAST AIR QUALITY M GMT. DIST., OVER A DOZEN YEARS OF RECLAIM
IMP LEMENTATION : KEY LESSONS LEARNED IN CALIFORNIA ’S FIRST AIR POLLUTION CAP AND -T RADE P ROGRAM I-3-6 (2007) [hereinafter O VER A D OZEN YEARS OF RECLAIM ],
available at http://www.aqmd.gov/reclaim/docs/Policy_Paper_Part1.pdf.
6. Cf. John K. Stranlund, Carlos A. Chávez & Barry C. Field, Enforcing
Emissions Trading Programs: Theory, Practice, and Performance, 30 POL ’Y STUD . J.
343, 348 (2002) (stating that “the monitoring strategies of the SO 2 and RECLAIM
programs are quite similar”).
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II. THE ENFORCEM ENT STORY OF THE ARP
The ARP is viewed as a very successful environmental regulatory
program.7 It was created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, and it
is administered by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
The program began in 1995 by regulating the emissions of the country’s
largest coal-fired combustion units, and it expanded significantly in 2000
to include gas- and oil-fired combustion units.8 Commentators have
particularly lauded the program’s achievements in compliance and
enforcement: the program has achieved almost 100% compliance and it
did so using sophisticated technology that facilitated the collection,
transmission, and verification of compliance.9 Like the story of the
program itself, the ARP’s enforcement story is one of success and
efficiency.
A. Continuous Electronic Verification
In the ARP , the EP A forged a system of self-monitoring and
enforcement that relied heavily on technology. The EPA required
many of the regulated sources to install costly emissions monitoring
technologies that provide continuous data.10 The EPA then developed
sophisticated information technology systems through which the data could
be transmitted and analyzed.11 The result was an “electronic verification”

7. See, e.g., Napolitano et al., supra note 4, at 47 David Harrison et al., Using
Emissions Trading to Combat Climate Change: Programs and Key Issues, 38 ENVTL . L.
REP . NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,367, 10,370 (2008); Swift, supra note 1, at 3.
8. The EPA defines a “unit” as a fossil fuel-fired combustor that serves a
generator that provides electricity for sale. See ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY , ACID RAIN
PROGRAM 2004 PROGRESS REP ORT, EPA 430-R-05-012 5 (2005), available at http://
www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/docs/2004report.pdf [hereinafter A CID RAIN PROGRAM
REP ORT 2004]. The original 263 units included in Phase I of the program were located in
110 electricity generation facilities. A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL ., M ARKETS FOR CLEAN
AIR: T HE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM 6 (2000), available at http://catdir.loc.gov/
catdir/samples/cam032/99016913.pdf. Phase I also included a number of “substitution
units,” bringing the total number of units participating in the first year of the program to
445 (see Table 1 infra p. ). Cf. Lesley K. M cAllister, The Overallocation Problem in
Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL . L. 396, 434 (2009).
See infra Table 1 for the number of units participating in the program in the years 1995
through 2007.
9. Swift, supra note 1, at 4.
10. Blas Pérez Henríquez, Information Technology: The Unsung Hero of MarketBased Environmental Policies, RESOURCES, Fall/Winter 2004, at 11 (citing an average
annual cost of about $124,000 per unit).
11. Joe Kruger & Christian Egenhofer, Confidence Through Compliance in
Emissions Trading Markets, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L & POL ’Y 2, 5 (2006) (on “Extensive
Use of Information Technology”).

4

MC A LLIS TER (D O N O T D EL ET E)

[VOL . 2: 1, 2010]

3/14/2016 9:10 AM

Enforcing Cap-and-Trade
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

system that largely avoided the need for the agency to conduct field
inspections to verify self-reported data.
The ARP featured very detailed monitoring and reporting rules. The
“Part 75” rules number several hundred pages, setting forth the requirements
about how a unit subject to the program must register with the EPA,
select a monitoring technology, install and certify monitoring systems,
monitor and record emissions data, conduct quality assurance/quality control
procedures, maintain records, and report emissions.12 EPA has also
developed an online policy manual about ARP monitoring and reporting
requirements that is about five-hundred pages long and is continually
updated.13
The program’s largest polluters, namely the coal-fired power plants,
were required to install Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems
(CEMS).14 CEMS are “electromechanical instruments that sample, analyze,
measure, and record” emissions information that are installed in the smoke
stack through which emissions pass.15 A “data acquisition and handling
system” records all data from the monitoring systems, translates it into
the required units of measure, and stores the data. Overall, about 36% of
regulated units were required to use CEMS, covering about 96% of
emissions.16
Gas- and oil-fired plants are allowed to use alternative methods based
on measurements of their fuel usage.17 For most such units, the rules
require that there be continuous monitoring of the fuel flow rate and
periodic sampling of the fuel characteristics, such as sulfur content and

12. Joseph Kruger, Companies and Regulators in Emissions Trading Programs, in
EMISSIONS T RADING: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN , DECISION MAKING AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES
3, 12 (Ralf Antes, Bernd Hansjürgens, Peter Letmathe, eds., 2008), available at
http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-05-03.pdf. See also CLEAN AIR M ARKETS DIV.,
U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY , PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE PART 75 RULE 8–17 (2009),
available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/emissions/docs/plain_english_guide_par75
_final_rule.pdf.
13. Kruger, supra note 12, at 11.
14. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651k (2000) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651 (2010)).
15. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Steven D. Schell, Self-monitoring and Self-reporting
of Routine Air Pollution Releases, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL . L. 63, 107 (1999).
16. Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note 13, at 15 n.12.
17. John Schakenbach, Robert Vollaro & Reynaldo Forte, Fundamentals of
Successful Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification under a Cap-and-Trade Program, 56
J. OF THE AIR & WASTE M GMT. ASSOCIATION 1576, 1577 (Nov. 2006). These are referred
to as the Appendix D units, referring to Appendix D of the Part 75 Rules.
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density.18 The fuel flow rate data are then used together with the results
of the fuel sampling and analysis to determine the SO2 emission rate.19
Gas- and oil-fired units that have emissions below a certain threshold are
considered “low mass emitters” and are not required to continuously
monitor their emissions.20 Rather, they estimate their hourly SO2 emissions
using fuel usage data and default emissions factors.
The rules specify a variety of quality assurance and quality control
(QA/QC) requirements depending on which monitoring technologies are
employed.21 For example, there are strict requirements for testing the
accuracy of the CEMS. After installing the CEMS, the facility is required
to conduct certification tests and submit a certification application including
the test results.22 Once certified, the source is also required to perform
QA testing on a regular basis using either in-house or contracted expertise.23
Required QA testing includes daily assessments (e.g., calibration
error tests), quarterly assessments (e.g., linearity checks), and semiannual or annual relative accuracy test audits (RATAs).24
The regulations require that the facility notify EPA and the state air
agency when QA testing is taking place so that the government could
send an observer.25 As an incentive for high accuracy readings, the
regulations provide for reduced QA testing requirements when favorable
test results are achieved.26 The rules contain missing data provisions
(MDPs) that must be applied to estimate emissions when continuous
monitoring equipment is not functioning or has not passed QA tests.27
The more data that is missing, the more that the MDPs are designed to
overestimate actual emissions. This gives sources an incentive to ensure
that their monitoring equipment is operational and quality assured.28
The program has featured extensive use of information technology to
electronically audit the very large volume of emissions data generated
18. U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY , supra note 13, at 29; interview with EPA CAM D
staff, EPA, in D.C. (Sept. 17 2009) (stating that 2-3% of emissions under the program
are monitored in this way).
19. U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY , supra note 13, at 29.
20. U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY , supra note 13, at 43 (§ 75.19); interview with
CAM D staff, EPA, in D.C. (Sept. 17 2009) (stating that less than 1% of emissions under
the program are monitored in this way).
21. Cf. Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1579.
22. Reitze & Schell, supra note 16, at 118.
23. Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1583.
24. U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY , supra note 13, at 16.
25. Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1583.
26. Id. at 1577.
27. Id. (explaining that the program’s “missing data provisions” (M DPs) get
progressively more stringent the longer that the monitoring device is inoperative).
28. U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 80. See also Lesley K. M cAllister,
Putting Persuasion Back in the Equation: Compliance in Cap and Trade Programs, 24
PACE ENVTL . L. REV. 300, 320–21 (2007).
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under the program.29 Regulated units report hourly emissions and related
data to EPA four times a year (on a quarterly basis) in a standard electronic
data reporting format.30 A “designated representative,” generally a facility
manager, must certify the truth and completeness of all reported data.31
Using the quarterly reports, EPA can track the quality of the emissions
data throughout the year as well as the status of emissions as compared
to the allowances held by each unit.32 EPA has developed software that
the regulated entities are encouraged to use to prescreen the data for errors.33
Once EPA computers receive the reports, EPA performs additional
electronic auditing to verify data accuracy and then notifies the source as
to whether the quarterly data are acceptable or not.34 Through the electronic
auditing, the EPA may also determine the need for a field audit or inspection,
which is generally performed by a state or local environmental agency
official.35
Administrative, civil, and criminal penalties may apply for violations.
If at the end of the compliance year a unit does not have sufficient
allowances to cover its emissions, an automatic penalty is assessed for
“excess emissions.” The penalty was statutorily set in 1990 at $2,000
per ton of SO2 and is indexed to inflation each year.36 In addition, EPA
automatically reduces the unit’s cap for the following year by the amount
exceeded. Civil and criminal penalties are applicable for violations of
monitoring and reporting rules, and they are also available at the EPA’s
discretion to supplement the automatic excess emissions penalties.37

29. Kruger, supra note 12, at 10. See also Reitze & Schell, supra note 16, at 116
(stating that twenty units would generate three to four million data values each year).
30. U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY , supra note 13, at 86–87.
31. M arjan Peeters, Inspection and Market-based Regulation through Emissions
Trading: The Striking Reliance on Self-monitoring, Self-reporting and Verification, 2
UTRECHT L. REV. 177, 180 (2006). See also Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1583
(providing the certification statement language); Reitze & Schell, supra note 30, at 116
(stating that civil and criminal penalties can be imposed for false statements).
32. U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY , supra note 13, at 17.
33. Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1578; Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note
12, at 4.
34. Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1578; Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note
12, at 4; Napolitano et al., supra note 4, at 52–53.
35. U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY , supra note 13, at 88–89.
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651j (1994) (current code at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651j (2010));
Napolitano et al., supra note 4, at 58 n.7.
37. Napolitano, supra note 3, at 54; Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work:
An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur
Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 T UL . ENVTL . L.J. 309, 321 (2001).
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B. Enforcement Outcomes
The ARP appears to represent a great success in terms of emissions
monitoring and enforcement. Notably, the program has generated a
complete set of emissions data for the largest SO2 sources in the
country.38 In contrast, for many environmental regulatory programs, the
data collected by environmental agencies is insufficient to determine
actual compliance rates and program effectiveness.39 The ARP has also
been cited as an example of “cooperative” enforcement. Interactions
between the EPA and entities regulated by the program have tended to
be “relatively harmonious.”40 Finally, the program has reportedly
required relatively minimal enforcement personnel and resources with its
heavy reliance on electronic auditing of data rather than physical field
inspections.41
Indeed, there have been strikingly few enforcement cases in the ARP,
either for excess emissions or for monitoring violations. As shown in
Table 1, from 1995, the first compliance year, through the 2007
compliance year, only 23 units out of a universe of about 3,500 that
participated in the program in one or more years were assessed penalties
for excess emissions.42 In total, $3,400,614 in penalties for excess emissions
was collected. With respect to monitoring, nine sources were assessed a
total of $589,805 in monetary penalties for monitoring violations from
1995 through June 2005.43 As described by the EPA, these violations have
generally stemmed from failures to install and/or operate monitoring
equipment, or failures to conduct the required testing of monitors or
report the results.44

38. Id. at 52.
39. Cf. Victor B. Flatt & Paul M . Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire
Straits: There is No Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 55, 58–59 (2009).
40. Kruger, supra note 12, at 14. See Lesley K. M cAllister, Beyond Playing
“Banker”: The Role of the Regulatory Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN . L. REV.
269, 287 (2007).
41. U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY, EPA430-B-03-002, TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO
DESIGNING AND OP ERATING A CAP AND T RADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL 4-6
(2003). See also M cAllister, supra note 42, at 286-87; M cAllister, supra note 29, at 321.
42. In addition to the automatic sanctions, EPA may also in its discretion assess
civil or criminal penalties for excess emissions. An EPA enforcement official explained,
however, that Acid Rain Program violations are low priority violations for the
enforcement division because there are not any more environmental gains that can be
achieved. Interview with EPA staff in D.C. (Sept. 17, 2009).
43. M cAllister, supra note 29, at 321–22.
44. Interview with EPA staff in D.C. (Jan. 6, 2006).
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TABLE 1: P ENALTIES FOR EXCESS EM ISSIONS IN THE
ACID RAIN P ROGRAM , 1995-2007
YEAR
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
TO TAL

NUMBER OF
UNIT S IN
PROGRAM
445
431
423
408
398
2,262
2,792
3,208
3,497
3,391
3,456
3,520
3,536

NUMBER OF
UNIT S OUT OF
COMPLIANCE
0
0
0
0
0
8
9
1
1
4
0
0
0
23

EXCESS
EMISSIONS
(TONS)
0
0
0
0
0
70
613
33
14
465
0
0
0
1195

TOT AL
PENALT IES
(US$)
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$187,740
$1,700,462
$94,017
$40,600
$1,377,795
$0
$0
$0
$3,400,614

III. THE ENFORCEM ENT STORY OF RECLAIM
RECLAIM was designed to reduce the sulfur oxide (SOx) and nitrogen
oxide (NOx) emissions from stationary sources that lead to smog in the
Los Angeles region. The program began operating in 1994. In contrast
to the ARP, the enforcement of RECLAIM has been challenging and
resource-intensive for its implementing agency, the South Coast Air
Quality Management District (SCAQMD). While its monitoring and
reporting rules were very similar to those of the ARP, the enforcement
needs of RECLAIM turned out to be very different. To verify compliance,
SCAQMD found it necessary to conduct comprehensive audits of each
facility after the end of the compliance year to determine whether the
emissions reported by the facility were accurate and whether the facility
had sufficient allowances to cover its emissions.
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A. Annual Compliance Audits
SCAQMD in many ways followed the example of the ARP in designing
the monitoring rules of RECLAIM.45 A great deal of effort was spent on
designing a monitoring system that could obtain accurate reports
of emissions from the sources, and many of the same techniques were
employed.46 Yet the enforcement system that emerged—verifying the
reported data through annual compliance audits—was much more labor
and resource-intensive, and it presented persistent problems for program
implementation.
The largest RECLAIM sources (referred to as major sources)47 were
required to install CEMS and report their emissions on a daily basis.48
About 15% of the sources installed CEMS, accounting for 84% of total
NOx emissions and 98% of total SOx emissions.49 Other sources
must calculate emissions by measuring fuel input and multiplying it
by an appropriate emission rate. The CEMS are subject to daily calibration
checks, routine quality assurance, and a semi-annual RATA.50 Designed
to take advantage of electronic reporting technology, the program required
that major sources use a “remote terminal unit” with special software to
collect the CEMS data, perform calculations, generate the appropriate
files, and electronically transmit.51 Other sources estimated their emissions
based on fuel input or operating time, and were required to submit data
either on a monthly or quarterly basis using either a remote terminal unit
or manual transmission.52
All RECLAIM facilities53 are required to submit quarterly emissions
reports and a final annual emissions report at the end of the compliance

45. SCAQM D, RECLAIM VOL . I, DEVELOP MENT REP ORT AND RULES EX-1 (1993)
(explaining that SCAQM D developed RECLAIM rules “with the assistance of the
federal EPA, the California Air Resources Board, and the RECLAIM Steering and
Advisory Committees.”).
46. Stranlund et al., supra note 7, at 348–49.
47. There are generally multiple RECLAIM emissions-producing “sources” at a
single RECLAIM “facility.” In 1996, for example, there were 329 RECLAIM facilities
and over 4,022 sources. S. COAST AIR QUALITY M GMT. DIST., RECLAIM PROGRAM
T HREE -YEAR AUDIT AND PROGRESS REP ORT 1998 1-3 tbl.1-1, 5-8 to -9 tbl.5-1 (1998)
(summing the number of sources categorized as major sources, large sources, and
process units in tbl.5-1) [hereinafter Three-Year Audit].
48. M cAllister, supra note 29, at 319.
49. Three-Year Audit, supra note 48, at 5-8 to -9
50. Over a Dozen Years, supra note 6, at I-2-2 to -3.
51. Three-Year Audit, supra note 48, at 5–16.
52. Id. See also Stranlund et al., supra note 47, at 349 (an estimate of emissions is
attained by multiplying the fuel use or time in operation by an emissions factor, such as x
emissions/unit fuel, or y emissions/hour of operation).
53. On the distinction between facility and source in RECLAIM , see supra note
48, at ES-1 to -2.
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year.54 Submitted emissions reports required “certification for accuracy by
the highest ranking facility official with responsibility for the subject
matter of the certification.”55 It was anticipated that, upon receipt of the
data, SCAQMD would perform “several automated audits, including
comparing the reported information with a facility’s historic data” to
determine whether a field inspection was necessary.”56
Other aspects of the monitoring and reporting rules were also similar
to the ARP. RECLAIM rules created incentives for accurate monitoring
by including punitive MDPs modeled after the ARP’s provisions, as well
as by allowing more leniency in the calculation of substitute data where
a CEMS has demonstrated a high level of performance.57 In addition,
as in the ARP, RECLAIM administrators took “a proactive approach to
work with the industry to resolve implementation issues” and “conducted
extensive compliance outreach activities.”58
However, unlike ARP, the operation of CEMS and information
technology systems in RECLAIM encountered problems. Installation
delays and technical malfunctions were so common in the first few years
of the program that about twenty percent of the emissions data were
calculated through the use of the missing data provisions.59 As stated by
SCAQMD in a report about its first three years of program implementation,
“the installation and maintenance of CEMS has proved to be a major
challenge in the RECLAIM program.”60 Many of these problems were
resolved by the fourth year of the program, and the reliance on data
generated by application of the missing data provisions accordingly
decreased.61 The report also stated that there had been problems associated
with computer programs to automate the process of emissions reporting.62

54. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (CARB), AN EVALUATION OF T HE SOUTH
COAST AIR QUALITY M ANAGEMENT DISTRICT’S AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM, V-8
(Jan. 2000).
55. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM , supra note 6, at I-3-15.
56. SCAQM D, supra note 46, at 4–14.
57. M cAllister, supra note 29, at 320–21; Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM ,
supra note 6, at I-2-3.
58. Three-Year Audit, supra note 48, at 5-1.
59. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM , supra note 5, at I-2-3.
60. Three-Year Audit, supra note 48, at 5-1.
61. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM , supra note 5, at I-2-3 (further showing that
an average of 6.3% of emissions were calculated using missing data provisions in the
years 1998 through 2005.).
62. Three-Year Audit, supra note 48, at 5–2.
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Indeed, several years after RECLAIM began, SCAQMD was still trying
to clarify its rules and requirements relating to electronic reporting.63
Even with electronic reporting, RECLAIM was unable to implement the
type of comprehensive electronic auditing used in the ARP. In a
retrospective analysis of the program issued in 2007, SCAQMD officials
explained that the diversity of the types of sources included in RECLAIM
prevented this. “The lack of uniformity in the data collected prevented
the development of an all-encompassing emission calculation tool that
could be employed facility to facility.”64 With many different types of
sources, many different types of monitoring and reporting equipment and
methods had to be used.
RECLAIM enforcement has required the use of time-consuming and
resource-intensive audits of each facility after the end of each compliance
year. Each audit is conducted by a team of SCAQMD inspectors, includes
a thorough review of the facility’s records and may take weeks to
complete.65 To detect violations, the inspectors examine not just the
physical facility and its RECLAIM-related equipment, but also exhaustively
review the reports and records required to be kept by each facility under the
program’s rules.66
The designers of RECLAIM apparently did not anticipate the need for
annual compliance audits. Rather, early program documents stated that
SCAQMD would inspect facilities and audit emissions records “throughout
the year,” with no mention of an audit after the year ended.67 In practice,
however, the agency found that such audits of each facility were necessary
to verify compliance.68 The audits revealed failures in the CEMS, such as
computer programming bugs, analyzer failures, and improper daily
calibration, as well as problems with the fuel meters and timers used to
calculate emissions using emissions factors.69 The audits also revealed data
calculation errors and inaccurate records that presumably could not have
been identified without the audits.70

63. Id. at 5–17.
64. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM , supra note 5, at II-2-2.
65. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM , supra note 5, at I-3-6.
66. Interview with District Prosecutor, S. Coast Air Quality M gmt. Dist. (June 29,
2010).
67. SCAQM D, supra note 46, at 4-15, 4-16.
68. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM , supra note 5, at II-2-2.
69. Cf. Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental
Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL . L. &
POL ’Y F. 231, 259–60 (stating “Emission factors are hotly argued among technical
specialists from different fields and change as new information becomes available.
Emissions factors are poor surrogates for actual measurements”).
70. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM , supra note 5, at II-2-3-II-2-5.
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Unlike the ARP, RECLAIM does not assess automatic penalties for
emissions that exceed allowance holdings.71 Rather, all types of RECLAIM
violations are subject to the civil penalties as set forth in state law. State
law provides for civil penalties of up to $75,000 per day of violation, but
SCAQMD must consider a variety of mitigating factors including the
extent of harm caused by the violation, the nature and persistence of the
violation, the unproven or innovative nature of the control equipment, any
action taken by the defendant to mitigate the violation, and the financial
burden to the defendant.72 As a result, regulators have considerable
discretion in how they calculate the applicable sanction. In addition to civil
penalties, facilities that exceed their caps are also penalized by a
deduction of the amount of their excess emissions from their cap in the
following compliance year.73
B. Enforcement Outcomes
Although many aspects of RECLAIM’s monitoring and enforcement
system were similar to the ARP’s, the outcomes diverged in important
ways. Like the ARP, RECLAIM has assembled a very complete and
reliable set of emissions data for the regulated sources, but the need to
conduct comprehensive annual audits of each facility has implied a
high administrative burden on SCAQMD. As the agency stated in its
retrospective analysis, “[a]ny program based on mass emissions needs to
take into account the resource needs for adequate enforcement under this
new method of measuring compliance.” In a 2002 review of RECLAIM,
the EPA concluded that the program demonstrates the possibility that
compliance and enforcement may require more attention, not less, when
cap-and-trade regulation replaces traditional command and control
regulation.74
71. Cf. Stranlund et al., supra note 7, at 350.
72. See California Health and Safety Code §§ 42,402.3, 42,403 (2009). The
RECLAIM rules further provide that any emissions “in excess of the allocation shall
constitute a single, separate violation for each day of the compliance year.” RECLAIM
Rule 2004(d)(1). The regulated source, however, has an opportunity to demonstrate that
they were in violation for fewer days. See RECLAIM Rule 2004(d)(2) (placing the
burden on the Facility Permit holder to establish the lesser period).
73. SCAQM D, supra note 46, at EX-15.
74. U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY, AN EVALUATION OF THE SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY
M ANAGEMENT DISTRICT’S REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES M ARKET—LESSONS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL M ARKETS AND INNOVATION 30 (2002) [hereinafter EPA Evaluation of
RECLAIM ], available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/reclaim/reclaim-report.pdf (basing
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The reliance on annual audits to verify compliance also imposed burdens
on the regulated entities and affected the allowance market. Because of the
audit, a facility’s compliance status cannot be fully ascertained until well
into the following compliance year.75 The audits typically commence
about two months after the end of the reconciliation period, and are not
completed until about nine months after the end of the reconciliation
period.76 In effect, if the reconciliation period lasts three months after
the end of the compliance year, final compliance determinations will not
be made for some facilities until near the end of the following compliance
year. Over that time, the facility is uncertain as to its compliance for the
previous year, and will be inclined to hold onto allowances to deal with
the possibility that it might need them.77
The burdens of enforcing RECLAIM are evident through analysis of
the enforcement actions pursued under the program. The analysis presented
below shows that enforcement actions were much more common than in
the ARP, with many hundreds more enforcement actions despite the fact
that RECLAIM was a much smaller program in terms of how many
pollution emissions it regulated. This section describes how the RECLAIM
enforcement data was collected and analyzed, as well as what the data
shows about the types of violations, discovery violation and case resolution
times, and settlement amounts. The final part of the section makes direct
comparisons between enforcement actions in RECLAIM and the ARP.
1. Data and Methods
Data about RECLAIM-related Notices of Violation (NOVs) were
acquired from SCAQMD through two public information requests and its
online public information system. SCAQMD issues a NOV to inform a
regulated company that it is out of compliance with applicable rules,
permit conditions or other legal requirements.78 A spreadsheet was
constructed containing all RECLAIM-related NOVs for violations that
occurred from the beginning of the program in 1994 through the end of
2006.
A full listing of the fields in spreadsheet and an explanation of their
contents are shown in Table 2. In total, the spreadsheet contained 949

its conclusions on data collected from November 2001 through January 2002). M cAllister,
supra note 41, at 302–03.
75. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM , supra note 6, at III-1-7 (discussing the
“enforcement lag”).
76. Each audit requires up to several weeks to complete. See id. at I-3-6.
77. M cAllister, supra note 41, at 299–300.
78. AQM D Notice, http://www.aqmd.gov/comply/not ices /nov.html (last visited
Nov. 15, 2010).
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NOVs for violations of RECLAIM Rules 2004, 2011, and/or 2012.79 Rule
2004 is a general rule that requires that RECLAIM facilities be in
compliance with all permit conditions.80 Excess emissions violations are
usually recorded as violations of Rule 2004. Rule 2011 and Rule 2012
specify the program requirements for monitoring, reporting, and
recordkeeping of SOx and NOx emissions, respectively. Each NOV
considered in this analysis is based on a violation of one or more of
these rules, as well as a possible violation of one or more non-RECLAIM
rules that also apply to the RECLAIM facility.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the types of dispositions of the 949
enforcement actions (each NOV is considered to be an “enforcement
action”) included closed (844); rejected (69); and other (18, including
cancelled, dismissed, bankruptcy, and compliance only). The remaining
18 listed no disposition and are presumed to be pending. The violation
description field contained the information that generally allowed a
classification of the type of violation, as described below in section
III.B.3. The settlement amount includes the dollar value of the monetary
penalty imposed on the facility to close the case. Settlement amount
values ranged from $150 to $81,012,360.

79. RECLAIM rules are numbered 2000 through 2020, and are available at
http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/rulesreg.html. See Three Year Audit, supra note 48. The
initial spreadsheet included 1309 NOVs, but 360 NOVs were excluded because they
were marked “VOID” or because they appeared to relate to violations of non-RECLAIM
rules that occurred at RECLAIM facilities.
80. As such, command and control requirements that were incorporated into the
RECLAIM permit are cited under Rule 2004 if violated. Email from SCAQM D (M ar.
30, 2010, 13:38 PST) (on file with author); email from SCAQM D (Apr. 2010). Those
NOVs that referenced a violation of Rule 2004 but were actually issued for violations of
non-RECLAIM requirements were not included in the analysis.
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TABLE 2: SPREADSHEET FIELDS AND EXPLANATIONS
OF THEIR CONTENTS
SPREADSHEET
FIELD
NOV Number
Rule Violated
Name of Facility

Facility
Identification
Number
Violation Date

Issue Date
Violation
Description
Disposition
Disposition Date
Settlement
Amount

16

EXPLANAT ION
The unique alphanumeric identifier that SCAQMD
assigns to a Notice of Violation, i.e. P12345.
Rule 2004, 2011 and/or 2012 (other SCAQMD rules
may also be listed as violated in the same NOV).
Generally the name of the company that owns the
facility. A single company may own multiple
RECLAIM facilities. Each facility is a stationary
source with NOx or SOx emissions generally greater
than 4 tons per year.
A unique 3 to 6 digit number assigned to each facility.

The date that the violation occurred (often the
inspector’s best guess or a default date such as the first
day of the compliance year in which the violation
occurred). The spreadsheet includes all NOVs issued
in RECLAIM with violation dates from 1994 through
2006.
The date that SCAQMD issued the NOV.
One or more phrases or sentences that indicate the
reasons that the NOV was issued.
The final status of the NOV: closed, rejected,
cancelled, dismissed, bankruptcy, or compliance only.
The date on which SCAQMD determined the
disposition of the NOV.
The monetary amount for which the NOV was settled;
only applicable for NOVs with a disposition of
“closed.” Many NOVs are settled in combination with
other NOVs for a single settlement amount.
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FIGURE 1: DISPOSITION OF RECLAIM ENFORCEM ENT
ACTIONS, 1994-2006
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2. Number of Enforcement Actions
A breakdown of the 949 RECLAIM enforcement actions by year of
the violation date is provided in Figure 2. The high number of violations
in 2000 and 2001 is likely to be related to the crisis that the RECLAIM
program underwent in these years as a result of the California electricity
crisis.81 In 2000, power-producing facilities in California increased their
production to respond to the electricity blackouts and concomitantly
purchased RECLAIM allowances to cover their increased emissions.82
Allowance prices drastically increased, and the program’s NOx emissions
exceeded the program cap in the years 2000 and 2001.83

81. See Paul L. Joskow, California’s Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REV. OF ECON .
POL ’Y 365, 379–80 (2001).
82. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM , supra note 6, at II-2-7.
83. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, ANNUAL RECLAIM AUDIT
REP ORT FOR 2000 COMP LIANCE YEAR ES-1 to -2 (2002); SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY
M ANAGEMENT DISTRICT, ANNUAL RECLAIM AUDIT REP ORT FOR 2001 COMP LIANCE
YEAR ES-2 (2003). For more description of the electricity crisis and its impact on
RECLAIM , see M cAllister, supra note 29, at 324–27.
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FIGURE 2: RECLAIM ENFORCEM ENT ACTIONS BY YEAR OF
VIOLATION DATE, 1994-2006
140
111

120

117

95

100
80

64

60

44

54

63

76

89
74

85
71

40
20

6

0

A remarkably high proportion of RECLAIM facilities have been the
subject of enforcement actions. In the years 1994 through 2006, the
RECLAIM universe of regulated facilities included about 330 facilities on
average.84 Each year, however, slight changes in the RECLAIM universe
occurred as facilities were newly included in the program; excluded
from the program because, for example, their emissions fell below the
threshold; or closed down. Considering that 345 facilities were in the
program at the end of the 1994 compliance year (see Table 3, infra) and
that about 100 facilities were newly included between the years 1995
through 2006, a total of about 445 facilities participated in the program
in at least one year of the program. Of these, 349 facilities (78%) were
subject to at least one RECLAIM enforcement action. As shown in Figure
3, the other 96 had no enforcement actions lodged against them.
Many facilities had repeat violations, as further shown in Figure 3.
About half of the facilities (221 out of 445) were subject to two or more
enforcement actions, while almost one-third of the facilities (135 out of
445) were subject to three or more enforcement actions.

84. The program began with 394 facilities but by the end of the first compliance
year, many had been excluded such that 345 facilities participated in 1994 compliance
year. In the 1995 through 2006 compliance years, the number of participating facilities
varied between 354 and 295 (see Table 3, infra).
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FIGURE 3: FACILITIES SUBJECT TO THE GIVEN NUM BER OF RECLAIM
ENFORCEM ENT ACTIONS
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3. Types of Violations
The enforcement actions were analyzed to determine the alleged type
of violation. As mentioned above, the violation description field generally
contains one or more phrases entered by the RECLAIM inspector describing
the basis for the NOV. The length, clarity, and specificity of the descriptions
varied greatly, and some required interpretation or inference to understand.
The descriptions were ultimately coded into 5 categories: excess emissions;
late or missing reports; inaccurate reports; lack of installation, maintenance,
or quality testing of monitoring equipment; and other unspecified violations
relating to monitoring, reporting or recordkeeping (MRR).
Figure 4 shows that the most common reason for the issuance of an
NOV was that the facility had late or missing emissions reports. Late or
missing reports was a basis for the NOV in 386 out of 949 (40%)
enforcement cases. Such NOVs were issued when the facility failed to
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timely submit the required daily, quarterly, or annual reports.85 The second
most common reason for the issuance of an NOV was that the emissions
of the facility exceeded its annual allowance holdings in a given year. This
reason was given in 356, or 38%, of the NOVs. Excess emission violations
are generally penalized in two ways: with a monetary penalty and by
deducting the amount of emissions that was over the allowance holdings
from the facility’s allowance holdings for the following compliance year.
The third most common reason for the issuance of an NOV was that
the facility failed to install, maintain, or quality test its emissions monitoring
equipment. This was alleged in 198, or 21%, of cases. RECLAIM rules
2011 and 2012 specify the types of periodic maintenance and quality
testing that is required once the equipment is installed. Facilities often
failed to calibrate equipment, conduct tune-ups, or perform other required
procedures within the specified period of time. In 128, or 13%, of the
enforcement cases, the violation resulted from inaccuracies in the emissions
reports. While often the inaccuracy was simply stated rather than detailed,
some descriptions revealed that the facility had, for example, used an
incorrect emissions factor, made an erroneous calculation, or misapplied
the missing data provisions. Finally, in 37, or 4%, of enforcement
cases, the available information indicated that the NOV was based on
MRR problems, but the nature of the problem was unspecified.
In total, 1105 reasons were listed in the 949 NOVs, accounting for the
fact that the above percentages add up to more than 100%. Often, for
example, a single NOV resulted from a combination of inaccurate reports
and monitoring equipment problems, or from a combination of late or
missing reports and excess emissions.

85.

20

See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 4: REASONS GIVEN FOR ENFORCEM ENT ACTIONS
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4. Violation Discovery and Case Resolution Times
The data also allowed calculation of the violation discovery and case
resolution times for those cases that had been disposed. As noted above,
18 of the 949 NOV cases were pending, leaving a group of 931 disposed
cases. Of these, 8 had unreliable dates, wherein the listed NOV issue date
came after the NOV violation date. For the remaining 923 NOVs, the
violation discovery time was calculated as the time elapsed between the
violation date and the issue date. The violation discovery time averaged 17
months. The case resolution time was calculated as the time elapsed
between the disposition date and the issue date. The case resolution time
averaged 13 months. In effect, the average RECLAIM enforcement action
took 30 months, or 2 and a half years, from the date the underlying
violation occurred to the date it was closed or otherwise disposed of. A
variety of problems in RECLAIM have resulted from this significant
“enforcement lag.”86
86. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM , supra note 6, at II-2-6 (using the phrase
“enforcement lag”). See also supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
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The lengthy time required for violation discovery in RECLAIM is
closely associated with SCAQMD’s reliance on annual audits to verify
facility emissions. Such audits cannot start until several months after the
end of the compliance year, and given the large number of facilities that
must be inspected and the small number of inspectors, they do not end
until well into the next compliance year. It is through this audit that many
rule violations that occurred during the compliance year are discovered.
For example, inspectors might conduct an audit for compliance year
2003 in July 2004, and discover a monitoring equipment testing violation
that occurred in August 2003. In this case, inspectors would record the
violation date as August 2003, and the NOV issue date would be July
2004, resulting in an 11 month time lapse between the two.
The average violation discovery time was particularly lengthy for NOVs
based on excess emissions. For these, the average violation discovery
time was about two years (25 months). For NOVs based only on
monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping (MRR) violations (including
late or missing reports, inaccurate reports, monitoring equipment problems,
and other unspecified MRR violations), the average violation discovery
time was just under one year. When both excess emissions and MRR were
cited as reasons, the average violation discovery time was again close to
2 years (23 months).
The particularly lengthy violation discovery time for NOVs based on
excess emissions can also be explained by SCAQMD’s reliance on annual
audits. For these NOVs, the violation date is typically listed as the first
day of the compliance year for which the facility was found to have
exceeded its emissions allowance. For example, inspectors might conduct
an audit for compliance year 2003 in July 2004, and discover that the
facility’s 2003 emissions exceeded its allowance holdings. In this situation,
inspectors would often record the violation date as January 1, 2003.
With an NOV issue date in July 2004, the violation discovery time would
be 19 months.
At an average of 13 months, case resolution times in RECLAIM were
also protracted. A SCAQMD prosecutor explains that case resolution takes
a lot of time because an NOV goes through several layers of review after
it is issued.87 The NOV goes first to the issuing inspector’s supervisor
and manager, who both conduct a detailed examination of it before signing
off on it. This review often takes 6 months or more due to an existing
backlog. Then it arrives at the prosecutor’s office, where investigators
further review the NOV. Finally it is assigned to one of the agency’s 4
or 5 prosecutors, who is then responsible for meeting with the violator
87.
2010).
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and negotiating the settlement. Because RECLAIM violations tend to be
complex, the prosecutor may have to spend considerable time explaining
it to the violator and coming to agreement on the amount of the penalty.
SCAQMD is able to settle almost all its cases and thereby avoid the need
for litigation to collect penalties.
5. Settlement Amounts
Settlement amount data were available for the 844 NOVs that resulted
in a disposition of “closed.”88 SCAQMD often settles multiple pending
NOVs against a facility in a single settlement. The 844 NOV were closed
through 595 settlement agreements, with 595 associated settlement
amounts. Also, in some settlements, particularly large ones, RECLAIMrelated NOVs may be settled together with non-RECLAIM-related NOVs.
For this reason, for all settlement amounts greater than $50,000, the
author consulted SCAQMD online public information system to determine
whether the settlement amount related primarily to RECLAIM-related
offenses. Of the 44 settlement amounts greater than $50,000, 16 were
excluded because the precipitating NOVs were a combination of
RECLAIM- and non-RECLAIM-related violations, with the majority of
NOVs being non-RECLAIM-related. The remaining 579 settlement
amounts form the basis of the analysis below.89
As apparent from Figure 5, more than half of the settlement amounts
were for less than $5000, and almost a third were for less than $2000. In
contrast, a few very high penalties were assessed for RECLAIM violations,
including a $17 million dollar penalty against AES Alamitos for excess
emissions during the California electricity crisis in 2001, and fines of
about $8 million and $2.5 million for combinations of excess emissions

88. Settlement amounts are usually paid in cash, but some settlement amounts also
include payment of all or a portion of the settlement amount through a Supplementary
Environmental Project (SEP). The SEP may include, for example, pollution-reducing
capital improvements to the facility that are not required by law or some kind of
investment for t he healt h benefit of t he communit y w here t he facility is situated.
Interview with District Prosecutor, S. Coast Air Quality M gmt. Dist. (June 29, 2010). In
a sample of 115 settlement amounts negotiated after July 25, 2006, 10 included SEPs,
and they constituted on average about 70% of the settlement amount. Response to
Public Records Request to South Coast Air Quality M gmt Dist. (Jun. 25, 2010).
89. The settlement amounts discussed in this section are overestimates, because it
is likely that some of the settlements under $50,000 are also based in part on nonRECLAIM violations. However, the author’s experience with the data suggests that the
large majority of settlements are due primarily or solely to RECLAIM violations.

23

MC A LLIS TER (D O N O T D EL ET E)

3/14/2016 9:10 AM

and monitoring violations against American Airlines and Shultz Steel
respectively. The median settlement amount was $4,600, the average was
$59,536, and the total of all settlement amounts was $34,471,112.
FIGURE 5: NUM BER OF OCCURRENCES OF SETTLEM ENT AM OUNTS IN
GIVEN VALUE RANGES
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On average, excess emissions were penalized with significantly higher
settlement amounts than monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping (MRR)
violations. To determine the differences, the 579 settlement agreements
were classified according to the reasons for the NOVs that they disposed
of. If all the RECLAIM-related NOVs disposed of by the settlement
were for excess emissions, the settlement amount was classified as an
excess emissions settlement. If all the NOVs disposed of by the settlement
were for MRR violations (missing or late reports, inaccurate reports,
monitoring equipment problems, and/or unspecified MRR problems), the
settlement amount was classified as an MRR settlement. Alternatively,
the settlement might have disposed of NOVs related to both excess
emissions and MRR. Figure 6 shows how many settlement amounts fell
into each of these categories.
The 79 settlements based on both excess emissions and MRR violations
averaged $155,074. The 153 settlements based on only excess emissions
averaged $129,529. The 347 settlements based on only MRR violations
averaged $6,923.
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FIGURE 6: NUM BER OF SETTLEM ENT AM OUNTS JUSTIFIED
BY GIVEN REASON(S)
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6. Comparing RECLAIM to the ARP
To make the quantitative comparison between enforcement outcomes
in RECLAIM and the ARP clearer, it is helpful to look at their
enforcement data over comparable times. Direct comparisons can be
made for enforcement actions based on both excess emissions and MRR
violations.
For the ARP, as presented above, excess emission data were available
for its first thirteen years, 1995 through 2007. The data showed that, in
total, 23 ARP units were penalized for excess emissions, and the total
penalty amount was about $3.4 million (see Table 1). Table 3 sets forth
comparable information for RECLAIM for its first thirteen years, 1994
though 2006. In RECLAIM, 316 facilities had excess emissions violations
in these years, and together they paid about $32 million in penalties.90 It
is important to note, however, that many of the penalties imposed for excess
90. There were 316 NOVs (out of 844 NOVs with a status of “closed”) issued in
whole or part because of excess emissions, with the years of the violation date
distributed as shown in Table 3. In about 10 cases, a single facility had two excess
emissions NOVs for a given year, but the violation description for most of these
indicated that the two excess emissions violations actually occurred in different years.
They were retained in the count because while removing them might have led to more
accuracy in the annual counts, it would have led to less accuracy in the total count.
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emissions in RECLAIM were also based on MRR violations. Of the $32
million shown in Table 3, about $20 million in penalties were assessed
on facilities for excess emissions alone and the other $12 million in
penalties were assessed for a combination of excess emissions and MRR
violations.91
TABLE 3: P ENALTIES FOR EXCESS EM ISSIONS IN RECLAIM,
1994 TO 2006
NUMBER
OF

FACILIT IES
YEAR OF
VIOLAT ION
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
TOT AL

IN

RECLAIM
345
334
329
326
331
354
335
330
332
324
311
304
295

NUMBER OF
FACILIT IES
WIT H EXCESS
EMISSIONS
0
5
42
10
23
45
50
32
25
28
17
19
20
316

PENALT IES FOR
EXCESS
EMISSIONS
(US$)
0
$33,400
$624,564
$78,267
$2,795,100
$8,813,277
$18,181,395
$397,774
$426,900
$208,875
$233,417
$197,400
$89,500
$32,079,869

In the ARP, as explained above, a total of $589,805 in monetary penalties
for nine monitoring violations was assessed from 1995 through June 2005.
In RECLAIM, 375 MRR violation cases had been concluded by June
2005.92 Penalties for these violations amounted to about $5 million, with
about $1.5 million in penalties assessed for MRR violations alone and
91. As discussed above, some of the penalties stated may also be based on nonRECLAIM violations settled at the same time as the RECLAIM violations. As also
discussed above, all settlement amounts greater than $50,000 were researched to ensure
that they were primarily based on RECLAIM ; those that were not were excluded from
the calculation of total penalties per year in Table 2, supra p. 11.
92. Five hundred and fifty-eight NOVs were closed between 1994 and July 1,
2005. Three hundred and seventy-five of the NOVs were issued in whole or part for
M RR violations. One hundred and eighty-three were issued only for excess emissions.
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the other $3.5 million assessed for a combination of MRR and excess
emissions violations.93
The much greater level of enforcement activity in RECLAIM is
particularly notable because RECLAIM is a significantly smaller program
in terms of the amount of pollution emissions that it regulates.94 Emissions
regulated by the ARP each year have been in the millions or tens of
millions of tons, while emissions regulated by RECLAIM each year
have been in the thousands or tens of thousands.95 In this sense, RECLAIM
is less than a hundredth the size of the ARP.
IV. CONCLUSION
The experience of the ARP is often cited as demonstrating the ease of
enforcing cap-and-trade regulation. The experience of RECLAIM provides
a counterpoint. Even though RECLAIM regulated far fewer emissions,
far more enforcement actions were pursued and far more penalties
were imposed on regulated entities. RECLAIM further suggests that
under some conditions, environmental agencies may find cap-and-trade
programs more difficult and costly to enforce than traditional regulation.
While this empirical study has focused on quantifying the differences
in enforcement outcomes in the two programs, data collected also shed
some light on the reasons for these differences. With respect to excess
emissions violations, it is significant that the program caps in RECLAIM
became very constraining in the year 2000, particularly due to the
California electricity crisis. The number of excess emissions violations
reached its highest point in the lifetime of the program in that year.
With respect to monitoring violations, it is notable that the ARP included
a more homogenous set of sources. The similarity of the sources appears
to have enabled a greater systematization of data collection, transmission,
93. The difference between the $3.5 million here and the $12 million above for
penalties assessed for a combination of M RR and excess emissions violations results
from the fact that the calculation above includes NOVs closed after July 1, 2005 (a set of
844 NOVs instead of 558 NOVs).
94. RECLAIM is also a smaller program based on the number of regulated
facilities. In 2009, there were 1,248 ARP facilities. In the latter half of the 2000s, the
number of RECLAIM facilities has hovered around 300 (see Table 3 supra p. 1).
However, as described in supra note 48, each RECLAIM facility generally includes
many sources. From available information, the number of ARP units (about 3500, see
Table 1) seems roughly comparable to the number of RECLAIM sources. See supra
notes 9, 48.
95. See M cAllister, supra note 8, tbl.1, tbl.2.

27

MC A LLIS TER (D O N O T D EL ET E)

3/14/2016 9:10 AM

and verification. It is also worth observing that RECLAIM’s enforcement
approach, namely the use of annual audits, was arguably much
more exhaustive than the ARP’s system of electronic violation. While all
RECLAIM facilities were comprehensively audited, the EPA relied very
heavily on electronic verification in the ARP and focused its efforts in this
regard on only the largest sources equipped with CEMS. The much larger
number of RECLAIM enforcement actions has likely resulted in part from
the greater effort expended to discover violations.
This study clearly shows that the ease of enforcement in cap-and-trade
cannot be assumed. Much will depend on how the cap-and-trade program
is designed, implemented, and enforced. Given the paramount importance
of accurate emissions data in cap-and-trade regulation, adequate resources
must be available to do the enforcement work necessary to ensure that
violations are discovered and sanctioned.
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